Waleska Velez v. Cuyahoga Metro. Housing Authority, 795 F.3d 578 (2015)

Citation: Waleska Velez v. Cuyahoga Metro. Housing Authority, 795 F.3d 578 (2015)
Parent Document: Waleska Velez v. Cuyahoga Metro. Housing Authority, 795 F.3d 578 (2015)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2015-07-30
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2821966/waleska-velez-v-cuyahoga-metro-... ↗

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In determining what Congress intended when it referred to rent in the Housing Act of
1937, we look to the traditional rules of statutory construction. The beginning point is the text of
the Act. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003). If the meaning of rent is
“unambiguous, the judicial inquiry is complete.” Id. (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain,
503 U.S. 249, 253–254 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “where Congress
uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a court must infer,
unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning
of these terms.” Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (quoting
NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981)). When interpreting federal law, we draw on

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