Waleska Velez v. Cuyahoga Metro. Housing Authority, 795 F.3d 578 (2015)

Citation: Waleska Velez v. Cuyahoga Metro. Housing Authority, 795 F.3d 578 (2015)
Parent Document: Waleska Velez v. Cuyahoga Metro. Housing Authority, 795 F.3d 578 (2015)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2015-07-30
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2821966/waleska-velez-v-cuyahoga-metro-... ↗

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The term “rent” is used extensively throughout § 1437f and its regulations but is not
defined in the context of the Housing Choice Voucher Program, § 1437f(o).8 Nor is rent defined
in any other provision of the Housing Act or its regulations despite also being used extensively
therein.9 In light of this consistent usage and absent any reason justifying the contrary, the
definition of rent throughout the Act, not only in Section 8, must be uniform. See Ratzlaf v.
United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994) (“A term appearing in several places in a statutory text
is generally read the same way each time it appears.”). But see Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v. United
States, 286 U.S. 427, 433-34 (1932) (holding that the presumption of uniformity gives way
“[w]here the subject-matter to which the words refer is not the same in the several places where
they are used”). 1.

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