Section 220
- Citation
- Section 220
- Parent Document
- Tenants' Council of Tiber Island-Carrollsburg Square v. James Lynn, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of Housing and Urbandevelopment, 497 F.2d 648 (1973)
- Jurisdiction
- United States (federal)
- Effective Date
- 1973-12-20
Other Sections in This Document (87)
- Tenants' Council of Tiber Island-Carrollsburg Square v. James Lynn, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of Housing and Urbandevelopment, 497 F.2d 648 (1973)
- Tenants' Council of Tiber Island-Carrollsburg Square v. James Lynn, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of Housing and Urbandevelopment, 497 F.2d 648 (1973)
- Tenants' Council of Tiber Island-Carrollsburg Square v. James Lynn, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of Housing and Urbandevelopment, 497 F.2d 648 (1973)
- Tenants' Council of Tiber Island-Carrollsburg Square v. James Lynn, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of Housing and Urbandevelopment, 497 F.2d 648 (1973)
- Tenants' Council of Tiber Island-Carrollsburg Square v. James Lynn, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of Housing and Urbandevelopment, 497 F.2d 648 (1973)
- Tenants' Council of Tiber Island-Carrollsburg Square v. James Lynn, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of Housing and Urbandevelopment, 497 F.2d 648 (1973)
- Tenants' Council of Tiber Island-Carrollsburg Square v. James Lynn, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of Housing and Urbandevelopment, 497 F.2d 648 (1973)
- Tenants' Council of Tiber Island-Carrollsburg Square v. James Lynn, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of Housing and Urbandevelopment, 497 F.2d 648 (1973)
- Tenants' Council of Tiber Island-Carrollsburg Square v. James Lynn, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of Housing and Urbandevelopment, 497 F.2d 648 (1973)
- Tenants' Council of Tiber Island-Carrollsburg Square v. James Lynn, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of Housing and Urbandevelopment, 497 F.2d 648 (1973)
- Tenants' Council of Tiber Island-Carrollsburg Square v. James Lynn, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of Housing and Urbandevelopment, 497 F.2d 648 (1973)
- Tenants' Council of Tiber Island-Carrollsburg Square v. James Lynn, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of Housing and Urbandevelopment, 497 F.2d 648 (1973)
- Tenants' Council of Tiber Island-Carrollsburg Square v. James Lynn, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of Housing and Urbandevelopment, 497 F.2d 648 (1973)
- Tenants' Council of Tiber Island-Carrollsburg Square v. James Lynn, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of Housing and Urbandevelopment, 497 F.2d 648 (1973)
- Tenants' Council of Tiber Island-Carrollsburg Square v. James Lynn, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of Housing and Urbandevelopment, 497 F.2d 648 (1973)
- Tenants' Council of Tiber Island-Carrollsburg Square v. James Lynn, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of Housing and Urbandevelopment, 497 F.2d 648 (1973)
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Full Text
704 chars22 The distinction between the two situations drawn by the court, based on teh difference in the purposes of the two types of projects, I think is not justified. In each instance the reasonable standard applies. What is reasonable in one case may be quite different from what is reasonable in the other, depending upon a number of factors, among them the ability to pay, but these different considerations must be judged, in their own settings, by the same prescribed standard of reasonableness. Therefore, as it seems to me, no legal distinction should be drawn which denies to one the opportunity granted to the other. Both are entitled to reasonable treatment with respect to their respective rentals.