The Ohio House, LLC v. City of Costa Mesa, 135 F.4th 645 (2024)

Citation: The Ohio House, LLC v. City of Costa Mesa, 135 F.4th 645 (2024)
Parent Document: The Ohio House, LLC v. City of Costa Mesa, 135 F.4th 645 (2024)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2024-12-04
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10287865/the-ohio-house-llc-v-city-of-c... ↗

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P.3d at 607 (quoting Calfarm Ins. Co., 771 P.2d at 1256).
Relatedly, “[f]unctional separability depends on whether
‘the remainder of the statute “is complete in itself.”’” Id. at
608 (quoting Sonoma Cnty. Org. of Pub. Emps. v. Cnty. of
Sonoma, 591 P.2d 1, 14 (Cal. 1979) (in bank)). “Volitional
separability depends on whether the remainder ‘would have
been adopted by the legislative body had the latter foreseen
the partial invalidation of the statute.’” Matosantos, 267 P.3d
at 608 (quoting Santa Barbara Sch. Dist., 530 P.2d at 618).
Volitional separability is the “the ‘most important’ factor in
the severability analysis.” Acosta v. City of Costa Mesa, 718
F.3d 800, 817 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Katz v. Children’s
Hosp. of Orange Cnty., 28 F.3d 1520, 1531 (9th Cir. 1994)).
    Here, both required inquiries would counsel in favor of
severing subsection 13-200.62(f)(7). The City’s reasonable-
accommodation regulation contains a severability clause,
which states that the validity of the regulation “shall not be
affected” if “any section, subsection, clause, or provision of
this article for any reason be held to be invalid . . .” CMMC
§ 13-200.63. Moreover, both grammatical and functional
separability are established because subsection 13-
200.62(f)(7) is a separate, enumerated provision that can be
cleanly severed without disrupting the syntax or meaning of
any other sections of the regulation; importantly, the
regulation, including the other seven required findings,
remains fully functional. See generally CMMC § 13-200.62.
And in addition to the explicit expression of legislative intent
found in the severability provision, the regulation’s purpose
provision states that “[i]t is the city’s policy to provide
reasonable accommodation in accordance with federal and
state fair housing laws.” CMMC § 13-200.60. This
unmistakably indicates that in passing its reasonable-
accommodation regulation, the City sought to comply with
54        THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

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