The Ohio House, LLC v. City of Costa Mesa, 135 F.4th 645 (2024)

Citation: The Ohio House, LLC v. City of Costa Mesa, 135 F.4th 645 (2024)
Parent Document: The Ohio House, LLC v. City of Costa Mesa, 135 F.4th 645 (2024)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2024-12-04
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10287865/the-ohio-house-llc-v-city-of-c... ↗

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free from discrimination based on a protected
characteristic.” Id. at 1143 (emphasis added). And Morris
makes clear that to establish a prima facie interference claim,
the plaintiff must prove that a defendant interfered with
protected activity because of discriminatory intent. Or stated
differently, a plaintiff must prove that discriminatory intent
was a partial cause of the defendant’s interference. But a
plaintiff “need not ‘prove that the [defendant’s]
discriminatory purpose was the sole purpose of the
challenged action’”; it need only be “a ‘motivating factor.’”
Id. at 1144 (emphasis added) (quoting Ave. 6E, 818 F.3d at
504).
    We adopt the Seventh Circuit’s approach to causation for
§ 3617 claims and make explicit what our decision in Morris
suggests: Proof of intentional discrimination or
discriminatory animus is required to establish a prima facie
§ 3617 claim based on an interference theory, but not on a
retaliation theory. Wetzel, 901 F.3d at 868 (“Proof of
discriminatory animus is not [required for retaliation
claims]. [Instead,] a claim under section 3617 requires
showing intentional discrimination only when considering
an interference claim.” (emphasis removed)); see also Bloch
v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 783 (7th Cir. 2009)
(“Discriminatory intent is the pivotal element [of an
interference claim]. . . . [A defendant’s actions] would
constitute ‘interference’ if it was invidiously motivated—
that is, if it was intentionally discriminatory.”). Again, we
review the district court’s denial of Ohio House’s renewed
motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo, Unicolors,
52 F.4th at 1063, but “we give significant deference to the
jury’s verdict and to the nonmoving part[y] . . . when
deciding whether that decision was correct.” A.D. v. Cal.
Highway Patrol, 712 F.3d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 2013).
            THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA                  41

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