The Ohio House, LLC v. City of Costa Mesa, 135 F.4th 645 (2024)

Citation: The Ohio House, LLC v. City of Costa Mesa, 135 F.4th 645 (2024)
Parent Document: The Ohio House, LLC v. City of Costa Mesa, 135 F.4th 645 (2024)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2024-12-04
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10287865/the-ohio-house-llc-v-city-of-c... ↗

Full Text

1,970 chars

right of handicapped persons to live in the residence of their
choice . . . .” Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1149 (emphasis added)
(quoting City of Edmonds, 18 F.3d at 806), such that obstacle
preemption applies. City of Los Angeles v. AECOM Servs.,
Inc., 854 F.3d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Crosby v.
Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000)).
The City need not give that required finding any weight in
assessing a request for reasonable accommodation and the
reasoning in Giebeler may not apply the same to the situation
here where a group-home operator is suing based on
limitations imposed on its ability to operate a facility due to
the presence of existing facilities, as opposed to a disabled
individual seeking occupancy. See Moody, 144 S. Ct. at 2397
(to establish obstacle preemption, the plaintiff must establish
“that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law]
would be valid, or . . . shows that the law lacks a plainly
legitimate sweep”).
     But even if Ohio House were correct that CMMC § 13-
200.62(f)(7) is preempted by the FHA, that does not mean
that the City’s entire reasonable-accommodation regulation
fails. See Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“As a general rule, courts are to ‘refrain from invalidating
more of [a] statute than is necessary,’ because ‘[a] ruling of
unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected
representatives.’” (alterations in original) (citation omitted)
(first quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258
(2005); and then quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N.
New England, 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006))). Rather, we
consider whether the inconsistent provisions can viably be
severed. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd.,
561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010) (“‘Generally speaking, when
confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to limit
the solution to the problem,’ severing any ‘problematic
52        THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA

Other Sections in This Document (107)

Full Text