Mary Cocchiarella v. Donald Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (2016)

Citation: Mary Cocchiarella v. Donald Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (2016)
Parent Document: Mary Cocchiarella v. Donald Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (2016)
Jurisdiction: Minnesota (state)
Effective Date: 2016-08-31
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4252990/mary-cocchiarella-v-donald-driggs/ ↗

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But the court has now determined that the plain meaning of “occupying” under section 504B.001, subdivision 12, merely requires a “present legal right” to actual possession of the residential dwelling. Such “present legal possession,” under the court’s rule, may be established by the effective date of a lease agreement, even if a tenant never gained actual (or “physical”) possession. The court’s reading of the word “occupying” is not > reasonable. Rather, for the reasons expressed below, the plain and only reasonable meaning of the word “occupying,” as . used in section 504B.001, subdivision 12, requires a “residential tenant” to have actual, physical possession of the residential dwelling under a lease or contract. Therefore, the lockout statute is inapplicable to Cocchiar-ella, who never “occupied]” the dwelling that was allegedly subject to an oral lease agreement with Driggs. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent,

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