Mary Cocchiarella v. Donald Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (2016)

Citation: Mary Cocchiarella v. Donald Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (2016)
Parent Document: Mary Cocchiarella v. Donald Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (2016)
Jurisdiction: Minnesota (state)
Effective Date: 2016-08-31
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4252990/mary-cocchiarella-v-donald-driggs/ ↗

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First, the word “occupying” has a definite and well-understood special or technical meaning in the context of the landlord-tenant relationship. See Staab, 813 N.W.2d at 72; In re Pamela Andreas Stisser Grantor Trust, 818 N.W.2d 495, 502 (Minn.2012); see also State v. Rick, 835 N.W.2d 478, 484-85 (Minn.2013) (concluding that a technical meaning was reasonable given the statutory context). The dictionary definitions of “occupy,” the common law, and the meaning of the words “occupancy” and “tenancy” in the landlord-tenant context consistently refer to both physical occupancy and to the legal right of occupancy under a residential lease.

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