White Cliffs at Dover v. Bulman, 151 N.H. 251 (2004)

Citation: White Cliffs at Dover v. Bulman, 151 N.H. 251 (2004)
Parent Document: White Cliffs at Dover v. Bulman, 151 N.H. 251 (2004)
Jurisdiction: New Hampshire (state)
Effective Date: 2004-07-16
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/8092914/white-cliffs-at-dover-v-bulman/ ↗

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Bulman first argues that the trial court erred when it held that the statutory presumption of retaliation under RSA 540:13-b was not applicable. Whether she was entitled to the presumption in RSA 540:13-b is a question of statutory interpretation. We are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole. Phetteplace v. Town of Lyme, 144 N.H. 621, 624 (2000). In interpreting a statute, we first look to the language of the statute itself, *254and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Appeal of Northeast Rehab. Hosp., 149 N.H. 83, 85 (2003). Where the language of a statute is clear on its face, its meaning is not subject to modification. Marcotte v. Timberlane/Hampstead School Dist., 143 N.H. 331, 337 (1999). We review the trial court’s interpretation of a statute de novo. Monahan-Fortin Properties v. Town of Hudson, 148 N.H. 769, 771 (2002).

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