dogs or that they were likely to attack other dogs or humans. 9 He described one of the dogs as
“hyper” and said that another occasionally growled if someone got too close to her but never bit
at anyone. He also stated that he allowed his six- and seven-year-old children to play with the
dogs and had never feared for their safety. No reasonable jury could conclude from this evidence
that Flores knew the dogs posed an abnormal danger to the public.
¶ 26. Plaintiffs argue that it is genuinely disputed whether Flores knew that the dogs were
likely to be aggressive because the dogs were pit bulls and pit bulls are generally known to be
dangerous. We reiterate that this Court has never adopted a breed-wide dangerousness standard
for dogs, and there is no evidence in this case to support such a departure from longstanding
caselaw. See supra, ¶ 17. The relevant issue here is whether Flores knew or had reason to know
that these particular animals were dangerous. Even if Flores qualified as the dogs’ keeper,
plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that he had such knowledge, as required to support their
negligence claim. 10 Id.
9
As we explained in footnote 8, supra, the evidence of alleged prior incidents involving
the Pearos’ dogs does not create a material dispute of fact where there was no indication that Flores
knew about these incidents.
10
As with Turner, there is no evidence in the record that Flores knew or had reason to
know that these dogs were pit bulls.
12
¶ 27. In the alternative, plaintiffs argue that Flores owed a duty to Eric Gross because he
voluntarily undertook to restrain the dogs after they ran out of the house. They rely upon the
Restatement sections providing that one who negligently performs a voluntarily assumed