similarly. See Brown v. Bolduc, 556 N.E.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (“It is difficult,
of course, to frame a universal definition of keepership, but a harboring with an assumption of
custody, management and control of the dog seems intrinsic to it.” (quotation omitted)); Verrett v.
Silver, 244 N.W.2d 147, 149 (Minn. 1976) (“One becomes the keeper of a dog only when he either
with or without the owner’s permission undertakes to manage, control or care for it as dog owners
in general are accustomed to do.”); Zwinge v. Love, 325 N.Y.S.2d 107, 109 (App. Div. 1971)
(holding that mere acts by visitor of calling dog, giving it commands, or letting it in and out of
house “would not be enough to constitute her as its harborer or keeper”).
¶ 24. According to plaintiffs, Flores voluntarily assumed the role of the dogs’ keeper
because he testified that he would have let the dogs out if they needed to relieve themselves and
would have given them water if necessary. They argue that Flores therefore owed a duty to restrain
11
the dogs and breached this duty by permitting his minor son to open the door of the house without
first ascertaining where the dogs were.
¶ 25. Assuming for the purpose of summary judgment that the above facts were sufficient
for the jury to find Flores was acting as the dogs’ keeper, plaintiffs’ negligence claim against him
still fails, for the same reason as their claim against Turner: they have not shown that Flores knew
that the dogs posed a threat to anyone. See Davis, 123 Vt. at 442-43, 194 A.2d at 68 (stating rule
that liability for injuries does not attach unless owner or keeper knew or had reason to know animal
was likely dangerous). There is no evidence that Flores knew of any prior incidents involving the