to her. As the factual premise upon which plaintiffs’ argument rests, the evidence is simply not
there. See Charles v. Mitchell, 118 A.3d 149, 152 n.4 (Conn. App. Ct. 2015) (affirming summary
judgment in favor of landlord; even assuming pit bulls were known for “ill-tempered and ferocious
tendencies,” plaintiff presented no evidence that landlord knew dog was pit bull).
5
To accept plaintiffs’ argument that Turner had a duty to investigate would be to impose
a form of strict liability on landlords who rent to pit bull owners. We have consistently declined
to adopt strict liability for dog owners, reasoning that such a change in the law is better left to the
Legislature. Martin, 2014 VT 55, ¶ 15; Hillier, 142 Vt. at 556, 458 A.2d at 1104; Godeau, 52 Vt.
at 254. For the same reason, we reject plaintiffs’ invitation to hold landlords who rent to owners
of pit bulls, or any other breeds, to a higher standard of care than the owners themselves.
8
impose a duty on landlord to investigate potential danger posed by tenant’s pit bulls; rather, issue
was whether landlord had knowledge of facts from which she could infer that dogs were vicious);
see also Uccello, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 748 (holding that landlord has no duty of care to third persons
harmed by tenant’s dog on premises unless landlord has “actual knowledge” of dog’s dangerous
propensities).6
¶ 19. Plaintiffs also argue Turner is liable for negligently permitting her tenants to create
a public nuisance on her land.7 Section 837 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which is closely
related to § 379A, states that a landlord may be held liable for a nuisance caused by an activity
carried out by a tenant if at the time of the lease the landlord consents to the activity or knows it