9
time of the lease that the Pearos’ dogs would necessarily cause an unreasonable interference with
public health, safety, or peace. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (1979) (defining public
nuisance). Because dogs are ordinarily considered to be safe and beneficial, the mere keeping of
a dog by a tenant is not sufficient to give rise to nuisance liability on the part of the landlord. There
must be some basis for the landlord to know that the particular dog or dogs will necessarily
interfere with a public right. See Stokes, 815 A.2d at 272 (explaining that as with § 379A, liability
under § 837 “hinges on the landowner’s knowledge, at the inception of the lease, regarding the
existence of a dangerous activity”); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 837, Reporter’s Note (b)
(explaining that “[i]f the activities consented to would not necessarily result in a nuisance and the
nuisance results only from the manner in which they are carried on by the lessee, the lessor is not
liable,” and collecting cases). There was no such evidence in this case.
¶ 20. Plaintiffs failed to make the showing that Turner knew or had reason to know that
the Pearos’ dogs were unreasonably dangerous as required to hold her liable under § 379A. They
likewise failed to establish a claim under § 837 because they have not demonstrated that Turner
knew or should have known that the dogs posed an unreasonable risk to public safety.8 We
therefore affirm the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of Turner.
II. Liability of Guest
¶ 21. We next consider whether Antonio Flores, the Pearos’ guest, may be held liable for
the injuries caused by the Pearos’ dogs. Plaintiffs argue that Flores was acting as the dogs’