Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Miller, 335 Conn. 474 (2020)

Citation: Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Miller, 335 Conn. 474 (2020)
Parent Document: Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Miller, 335 Conn. 474 (2020)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2020-04-27
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4801014/office-of-chief-disciplinary-co... ↗

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attorneys.’’ [Respondent’s Ex. S]. This is clearly contrary
          to her claim at the hearing, and as addressed in her
          posthearing brief, that disciplinary authorities refused
          to investigate. Moreover, there is no evidence that she
          ever resubmitted the materials consistent with the pro-
          visions of Practice Book § 2-32 (a).
            Again, the defenses raised by the respondent are not
          properly before the court in this proceeding and, fur-
          ther, would fail even if they were properly before the
          court because she has failed to meet her burden of
          proof in this regard.13
                                               V
                                       DISCIPLINE
             Pursuant to Practice Book § 2-47 (a), if the court
          finds following a presentment hearing that an attorney
          has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, it may
          impose a ‘‘reprimand, suspension for a period of time,
          disbarment or such other discipline as the court deems
             13
                The respondent spent a considerable portion of her time at the hearing
          addressing the claim of disparate treatment. She presented her own testi-
          mony, that of Rebecca Johnson, and cross-examined witnesses Attorney
          Michael Bayone and Attorney Betsy Ingraham on the issue. However, her
          focus on this issue did nothing to address or rebut the allegations contained
          in the four counts of the presentment. For example, she claims in part that
          cases were dismissed because she used a caseflow request form to ask for
          a continuance of a trial date instead of a motion for continuance form. This,
          however, ignores the ample evidence that there were multiple other reasons
          that collectively led to the dismissals and it was not based solely on her
          use of a caseflow request form. She also claimed that when she confronted
          a judge, claiming that ex parte communications were held between that
          judge and opposing counsel, the judge failed to respond and such silence
          constituted an admission on the judge’s part. This of course is of no moment
          as the judge was not a party or witness in the proceeding and therefore
          was not subject to questioning or any obligation to answer a question posed.
          The respondent has gone so far as to uniquely characterize her view of the
          motive behind her treatment by disciplinary authorities. On page 15 of her
          posthearing brief, the respondent states, ‘‘[s]omeone with a desire to remove
          a pesky Negress from practicing in the Connecticut courts surely had a
          hand in this matter.’’
November 3, 2020          CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                          Page 67

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