Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Miller, 335 Conn. 474 (2020)

Citation: Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Miller, 335 Conn. 474 (2020)
Parent Document: Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Miller, 335 Conn. 474 (2020)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2020-04-27
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4801014/office-of-chief-disciplinary-co... ↗

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either. They simply recite legal conclusions of racial
         discrimination or retaliation unsupported by any factual
         allegations, and such conclusory allegations are insuffi-
         cient to properly plead a special defense. See Vendor
         Resource Management v. Estate of Zackowski, Superior
         Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV-17-
         6016941-S (August 10, 2017) (Vitale, J.). It has long been
         held that special defenses must allege facts which the
         proponent then has the burden to prove. See Kaye v.
         Housman, 184 Conn. App. 808, 817, 195 A.3d 1168
         (2018).
            Moreover, the allegations of her affirmative defenses
         do not actually constitute a special defense; instead,
         they constitute an independent cause of action through
         which the respondent can seek specific damages or
         other relief. See, e.g., Sovereign Bank v. Harrison, 184
         Conn. App. 436, 444, 194 A.3d 1284 (2018); Mitchell v.
         Guardian Systems, Inc., 72 Conn. App. 158, 167 and
         n.6, 804 A.2d 1004, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 903, 810 A.2d
         269 (2002). ‘‘Although a counterclaim is similar to a
         special defense in that both are employed by a defen-
         dant to diminish or defeat a plaintiff’s claim, they none-
         theless are separate and distinct types of pleadings.
         . . . The heart of the distinction is that a counterclaim
         is an independent cause of action, and a special defense
         is not. See Historic District Commission v. Sciame,
         152 Conn. App. 161, 176, 99 A.3d 207 (a counterclaim
         is a cause of action . . . on which the defendant might
         have secured affirmative relief had he sued the plaintiff
         in a separate action . . .), cert. denied, 314 Conn. 933,
         102 A.3d 84 (2014); Valentine v. LaBow, [95 Conn. App.
         436, 447 n.10, 897 A.2d 624 (a special defense is not an
         independent action), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 933, 909
         A.2d 963 (2006)]. . . . [A] special defense operates as
         a shield, to defeat a cause of action, and not as a sword,
         denial, of such matters as the statute of frauds, or title in a third person to
         what the plaintiff sues upon or alleges to be the plaintiff’s own.’’
Page 64                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                    November 3, 2020

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