Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Miller, 335 Conn. 474 (2020)

Citation: Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Miller, 335 Conn. 474 (2020)
Parent Document: Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Miller, 335 Conn. 474 (2020)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2020-04-27
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4801014/office-of-chief-disciplinary-co... ↗

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to seek a judicial remedy for a wrong . . . .’’ (Citations
          omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sovereign
          Bank v. Harrison, supra, 444.
             In fact, at the presentment hearing, the respondent
          presented evidence through her witness Rebecca John-
          son that she has in fact done so. In Johnson v. Carras-
          quilla, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:17-
          CV-01429 (MPS) (D. Conn.), the respondent is a coplain-
          tiff who has brought an action against Karyl Carrasquilla
          as Chief Disciplinary Counsel and Michael Bowler as
          Bar Counsel for the SGC, alleging that ‘‘Johnson and
          Miller have been targeted by the attorney discipline
          authorities in a racially discriminatory manner, and in
          part because of their civil rights litigation practice.’’
          [See Respondent’s Ex. N, § 27]. In the complaint, the
          respondent makes the same arguments and allegations
          that she presented in her testimony and pleadings to this
          court as part of the presentment hearing. That federal
          complaint goes into considerable detail relative to her
          claim of disparate treatment by the disciplinary authori-
          ties relative to herself, Rebecca Johnson and other Afri-
          can-American attorneys as compared to the treatment
          given to Caucasian attorneys engaging in what they
          describe as similar conduct. From a review of that com-
          plaint, it is clear that even if the respondent’s special
          defenses are not viable in the presentment hearing, she
          will not be prejudiced if precluded from pursuing them
          as she has already exercised her right to relief from
          and for such treatment in a prior pending claim in fed-
          eral court. Indeed, the fact that the respondent has
          brought an action based on these allegations only rein-
          forces the court’s conclusion that her ‘‘affirmative
          defenses’’ are not proper special defenses.
            In the matter now before this court, the respondent
          has, through her own testimony and that of Rebecca
          Johnson, set forth a lengthy recitation of the conduct
          that they engaged in which led to disciplinary action
November 3, 2020          CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                          Page 65

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