applied the federal retroactivity analysis as established in Teague." Haghighi, 178
Wn.2d at 464, 462; see ajso Markel, 154 Wn.2d at 268; Abrams, 163 Wn.2d at 291
(interpreting RCW 10.73.100(6) consistent with Teague); In re Pers. Restraint of Benn,
134 Wn.2d 868, 939-40, 952 P.2d 116 (1998).
The cases Carney relies on to argue that the exception under RCW 10.73.100(6)
applies are inapposite. None of these cases address retroactivity, implicate a new
constitutional procedural rule, or address whether sufficient reasons exist to require
retroactive application of the changed legal standard. See In re Pers. Restraint of
Lavery, 154 Wn.2d 249, 111 P.3d 837 (2005) (holding change in law determining strike
offenses was significant change in the law without discussing retroactivity); In re Pers.
Restraint of Rowland, 149 Wn. App. 496, 204 P.3d 953 (2009) (holding change in
comparability rule affecting offender score is significant change in the law under RCW
10.73.100(6) without discussing retroactivity); In re Pers. Restraint of Smith, 117 Wn.
App. 846, 73 P.3d 386 (2003), abrogated by In re Pers. Restraint of Domingo, 155
Wn.2d 356, 119 P.3d 816 (2005) (holding that change to limits of accomplice liability
was significant change in the law under RCW 10.73.100(6) without discussing
retroactivity).
15
No. 68168-1-1/16
Because Jones is not retroactive, Carney cannot collaterally attack the 1982
acquittal by reason of insanity and commitment or the 2011 order revoking conditional
release. We affirm.
y\\ /vPU \A ^ i
WE CONCUR:
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16