proceeding.'" Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 418, 124 S. Ct. 2504, 159 L. Ed. 2d 494
(2004)10 (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 111 L. Ed. 2d
193 (1990)). In applying the second Teague exception, the Court has "looked to the
example of Gideon, and 'we have not hesitated to hold that less sweeping and
fundamental rules' do not qualify." Whorton v. Bockting. 549 U.S. 406, 421, 127 S. Ct.
1173, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2007) (quoting Beard, 542 U.S. at 418).
In Gideon, the Court held that counsel must be appointed for any indigent
defendant charged with a felony. Gideon. 372 U.S. at 344-45. When a defendant who
wishes to be represented by counsel is denied representation, Gideon held that the risk
of an unreliable verdict is intolerably high. Gideon. 372 U.S. at 344-45; see Mickens v.
Taylor. 535 U.S. 162, 166, 122 S. Ct. 1237, 152 L. Ed. 2d 291 (2002); United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984). The new rule
announced in Gideon eliminated this risk.
The new rule in Jones is in no way comparable to Gideon, and the relationship of
the Jones rule to the accuracy of the fact-finding process is far less direct or profound.
Gideon effected a profound and " 'sweeping'" change. Whorton, 549 U.S. at 421
(quoting Beard, 542 U.S. at 418). The decision in Jones did not change the need for
the jury to first determine whether a defendant committed the charged crime or the right
to assert the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. Emphasizing the right under
Faretta to control the defense, the court in Jones limited the authority of the trial court to
impose the defense over the objection of a competent defendant. Jones, 99 Wn.2d at
740.