because he did not receive notice of the statutory one-year time limit. Whether the
statutory one-year time bar applies is a question of law that we review de novo. State v.
Schwab. 141 Wn. App. 85, 91, 167 P.3d 1225 (2007).
On July 6, 1982, the jury found Carney committed the crime of arson in the first
degree but was not guilty by reason of insanity. The court entered the order of acquittal
by reason of insanity and order of commitment on July 9, 1982.
In 1989, the legislature enacted RCW 10.73.090. Laws of 1989, ch. 395, § 1.
RCW 10.73.090 imposes a one-year time bar on a collateral attack. Under RCW
10.73.090, a defendant must file a collateral attack within one year of the judgment and
sentence becoming final, and the court must advise the defendant of the one-year time
bar at sentencing. RCW 10.73.110.
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Under RCW 10.73.130, the one-year time bar applies only to a collateral attack
filed more than one year after July 23, 1989. RCW 10.73.120 requires the Department
of Corrections to "attempt to advise" those who, on July 23, 1989, were "serving a term
of incarceration, probation, parole, or community supervision," of the new statutory time
limit to file a collateral attack.
In In re Pers. Restraint of Bratz, 101 Wn. App. 662, 5 P.3d 759 (2000), we held
the notification provision under RCW 10.73.120 violated equal protection as applied to
defendants committed following an acquittal by reason of insanity. Bratz. 101 Wn. App.
at 669-70. We adhere to Bratz and hold the court erred in ruling Carney's collateral
attack of the 1982 acquittal and commitment was time barred. See also In re Pers.