Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 681681.pdf

10 (Emphasis in original) (alteration in original).
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No. 68168-1-1/14

We hold that the change in the law and new rule of criminal procedure adopted

by the court in Jones is not a watershed rule that applies retroactively. See Markel, 154

Wn.2d at 273 (refusing to apply Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354,

158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), retroactively); Evans, 154 Wn.2d at 447-48 (concluding

neither Apprendi v. New Jersey. 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435

(2000), nor Blakelv v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403

(2004), apply retroactively); State v. Abrams, 163 Wn.2d 277, 290-92, 178 P.3d 1021

(2008) (perjury statute requiring judge rather than jury to determine materiality was

unconstitutional but not retroactive).11
RCW 10.73.100(6)

Carney argues that even if the two exceptions under Teague do not apply, the

decision in Jones is retroactive under the significant and material change in the law

exception to the one-year time bar on collateral attacks under RCW 10.73.100(6).12 We
disagree. In a recent case, In re Pers. Restraint of Haghighi, 178 Wn.2d 439, 309 P.3d
459 (2013), the Washington Supreme Court reiterated that it has "interpreted RCW