Upon our conclusion that the initial criteria for the imposition of civil liability pursuant to a negligence per se theory have been met, we must now examine whether the violation of §§ 47a-8 and 47a-54f impose negligence per se or more properly strict liability. The defendants contend that they had to be notified of the lead-based paint defect in order for civil liability to enter. The defendants cite to numerous cases where a landlord’s liability for a defect in the premises has been predicated upon a finding of notice. These cases are distinguishable from the present case in that they did not involve the violation of a statute specific to the defect alleged, but rather, were clearly predicated upon common law negligence principles.9 In enacting §§ 47a-8 and 47a-54f, the legislature has already acknowledged that the presence of a certain amount of lead in paint or the presence of peeling or flaking paint which constitutes a health hazard is a defect, and *135that a landlord has a duty to remedy a situation where such a defect exists. In essence, the defendants posit that the alleged violations of §§ 47a-8 and 47a-54f should be excused, because they neither knew nor should have known of the occasion for compliance with the statutes.