“The doctrine of negligence per se serves to superimpose a legislatively prescribed standard of care on the general standard of care. Wendland v. Ridgefield Construction Services, Inc., 184 Conn. 173, 178, 439 A.2d 954 (1981).” Staudinger v. Barrett, 208 Conn. 94, 101, 544 A.2d 164 (1988). “ ‘Where a statute is designed to protect persons against injury, one who has, as a result of its violation, suffered such an injury as the statute was intended to guard against has a good ground of recovery.’ Knybel v. Cramer, 129 Conn. 439, 443, 29 A.2d 576 [1942]; Coughlin v. Peters, 153 Conn. 99, 102, 214 A.2d 127 [1965]. That principle of the law sets forth two conditions which must coexist before statutory negligence can be actionable. First, the plaintiff must be within the class of persons protected by the statute. [Coughlin v. Peters, supra, 101]; Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 473, 12 A.2d 646 [1940]; Monroe v. Hartford Street Ry. Co., 76 Conn. 201, 207, 56 A. 498 *131[1903]. Second, the injury must be of the type which the statute was intended to prevent. Toomey v. Danaher, 161 Conn. 204, 212, 286 A.2d 293 [1971]; Longstean v. McCaffrey’s Sons, 95 Conn. 486, 493, 111 A. 788 [1920]. See Prosser, Torts (4th Ed.) § 36; Restatement (Second), 2 Torts §§ 286, 288.” Wright v. Brown, 167 Conn. 464, 468-69, 356 A.2d 176 (1975).