Section 9A

Citation: Section 9A
Parent Document: Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts (state)
Effective Date: 2009-10-28
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/8357287/johnson-v-rufo/ ↗

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Although foreseeability is normally a question of fact, in some situations it can be addressed on summary judgment. See Sharpe v. Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc., 401 Mass. 788, 797 (1988); Kaufman v. Boston Dye House, Inc., 280 Mass. 161, 169 (1932). In Weeks v. Calnan, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 933 (1995), the Appeals Court affirmed a Superior Court judge’s decision allowing summary judgment in favor of the defendant where the plaintiffs conduct was the “independent, intervening force, breaking the chain of causation between the defendant’s alleged breach of duly and the [plaintiffs] injury.” Id. at 934. The defendant in Weeks breached his duty of care by failing to remove heavy furniture from his tenant’s apartment. Id. at 933-934. The tenant hurt herself when she attempted to move the object on her own. Id. at 933. While the court acknowledged that “it was perhaps foreseeable that the defendant’s failure to remove the table might lead the tenant to resort to self-help . . . ,” the court concluded that the defendant could not have reasonably foreseen that the tenant “would attempt the move, unaided, in an unsafe manner.” Id. at 934.

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