Section 9A
- Citation
- Section 9A
- Parent Document
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Jurisdiction
- Massachusetts (state)
- Effective Date
- 2009-10-28
- Original Source
- https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/8357287/johnson-v-rufo/ ↗
Other Sections in This Document (34)
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Johnson v. Rufo, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 226 (2009)
- Section 9A
- Section 9A
- Section 9A
- Section 9A
- Section 9A
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- Section 9A
Full Text
771 charsCausation normally presents a factual inquiry. Mullins v. Pine Minor College, 389 Mass. 47, 58 (1983). Here, however, Rufo did not cause Johnson’s injuries because the latter’s intervening conduct constituted the superseding cause of his harm. The intervening act of a party is a superceding cause that breaks off the chain of causation when the defendant could not have reasonably foreseen the occurrence of such act. Thus, the test of whether an independent intervening act interrupts the original chain of causation is the foreseeability of that act. Irwin v. Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 762 (1984). The definition of reasonable foreseeability is limited by “considerations of policy and pragmatic judgment.” Poskus v. Lombardo’s of Randolph, Inc., 423 Mass. 637, 640 (1996).