In Simon v. Solomon, supra at 101, we interpreted the new statute and concluded with respect to civil liability it was not necessary for a tenant to show malicious intent to recover against a landlord; we said that the statute covered “at the least” the reckless conduct that had been shown in that case. Id.6 Twelve years later, in Cruz Mgt. Co. v. Thomas, supra, we rejected a claim that a violation of G. L. c. 186, § 14, could be imposed only if it were proved that a landlord was reckless in disregarding his tenant’s rights, and we concluded that negligent conduct, conduct involving “some degree of fault,” by a landlord could support the imposition of liability under § 14. Id. at 789. We noted that a landlord’s failure “to repair defects of which he has notice in leased premises is an omission which frequently has been deemed to violate § 14.” See Cruz, supra at 789, citing Simon v. Solomon, supra at 103 (failure to control floods in tenant’s apartment); Darmetko v. Boston Hous. Auth., 378 Mass. 758, 761 (1979) (failure to repair leaky roof); Dorgan v. Loukas, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 959, 960 (1985) (failure to bring apartment into habitable condition and keep it so). Today we make clear what was implicit in those rulings: to support the imposition of liability under the quiet enjoyment statute, there must be a showing of at least negligent conduct by a landlord and violation of the lead *851paint statute alone is not sufficient to prove such negligence. Stated differently, to obtain relief under § 14 for a claim of lead paint poisoning it must be demonstrated that the landlord had notice of or reason to know of the presence of lead and failed to take appropriate corrective measures.