Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 1013299.pdf

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For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
Crossroads Management, LLC v. Ridgway et al., No. 101329-9

II. Absent a trial de novo, a party may not appeal from a prearbitration order,
even if that order limited claims at arbitration
In addition to seeking a trial de novo of the arbitration award, the Lewises

sought to appeal the trial court’s summary judgment order that disallowed statutory

double damages and limited their recoverable damages to the principal sum of their

deposit. They argue that they are entitled to appeal the summary judgment order

independent of their trial de novo request. We disagree.

It is well settled that a trial de novo is “the sole way to appeal” an adverse

arbitration award. Malted Mousse, 150 Wn.2d at 529; see also Dill v. Michelson

Realty Co., 152 Wn. App. 815, 820, 219 P.3d 726 (2009) (“The remedies for an

unsatisfactory arbitration award are ‘limited to a trial de novo . . . and, in very limited

circumstances, a motion to vacate the judgment on the award.’” (alteration in

original) (quoting 15A KARL B. TEGLAND & DOUGLAS J. ENDE, WASHINGTON

PRACTICE: WASHINGTON HANDBOOK ON CIVIL PROCEDURE § 79.3 authors’ cmt. at

613 (2008-09 ed.)). SCCAR 6.3 embodies the effect of the trial de novo appeal right.

It directs the trial court to enter judgment on the arbitration award if a party does not

properly request a trial de novo and specifies that the judgment “is not subject to

appellate review and it may not be attacked or set aside except by a motion to vacate

under CR 60.” SCCAR 6.3.

Division Three of the Court of Appeals applied this rule in Cook v. Selland

Construction, Inc. to dismiss an appeal of a prearbitration order denying a motion