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Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 1013299.pdf

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Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 1013299.pdf
Jurisdiction
Washington (state)
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signature was not [Defendant’s] fault.” CP at 674. The court “found that there was

substantial compliance” with the rule. Verbatim Rep. of Zoom Proc. (VRZP) at 4

(Sept. 25, 2020). The Ridgways sought reconsideration, arguing that the Lewises

were not required to use the county’s form and that the SCCARs require strict

compliance. The trial court denied the motion, and the parties proceeded to a trial

6
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
Crossroads Management, LLC v. Ridgway et al., No. 101329-9

de novo. The Lewises again prevailed on their sole claim for return of their security

deposit.

Both parties then moved for attorney fees and costs under various statutes.

The Ridgways sought attorney fees and costs under RCW 7.06.060, which

authorizes fees “against a party who appeals the [arbitration] award and fails to

improve his or her position on the trial de novo.” See also SCCAR 7.3 (“The court

shall assess costs and reasonable attorney fees against a party who appeals the award

and fails to improve the party’s position on the trial de novo.”). They also requested

attorney fees incurred during arbitration under RCW 4.84.250-.300. The Lewises

requested attorney fees and costs under RCW 59.18.280(2), which authorizes such

an award for the prevailing party “in any action brought by the tenant to recover” a

security deposit. They claimed to be the prevailing party because they recovered the

full amount of their security deposit.

The trial court affirmed the arbitrator’s award of fees and costs to the

Ridgways and awarded an additional $12,890.50 in fees to the Ridgways for the trial

de novo pursuant to RCW 7.06.060, plus $455.92 in costs. VRZP at 16 (Mar. 26,