Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 1013299.pdf

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For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
Crossroads Management, LLC v. Ridgway et al., No. 101329-9

clause”). This signature requirement essentially abrogates an attorney’s authority as

an agent to sign the request on behalf of the aggrieved party. See Russell v. Maas,

166 Wn. App. 885, 887-88, 891, 272 P.3d 273 (2012) (signature requirement

satisfied when an attorney signs a trial de novo request on behalf of a client); see

also Hanson v. Luna-Ramirez, 19 Wn. App. 2d 459, 462, 496 P.3d 314 (2021)

(noting that cases permitting “only an attorney, rather than the aggrieved party, to

sign a request for trial de novo . . . have been superseded by statute”).

Courts strictly construe the arbitration rules to best effectuate “the

Legislature’s intent in enacting the statutes upon which the arbitration rules are

based, namely to ‘alleviate the court congestion and reduce the delay in hearing civil

cases.’” Wiley, 143 Wn.2d at 344 (quoting Christie-Lambert Van & Storage Co. v.

McLeod, 39 Wn. App. 298, 302, 693 P.2d 161 (1984)). “[F]ailure to strictly comply

with MAR 7.1(a)’s filing requirement prevents the superior court from conducting a

trial de novo.” Nevers, 133 Wn.2d at 811-12 (emphasis omitted). Substantial

compliance is insufficient. Id. at 815.

The Lewises do not argue they complied with the statute or court rule. Instead,

they urge us to adopt a narrow exception to the mandatory signature requirement and

recognize that a trial court has the power to suspend the rules “arising both in equity

and in its inherent power to control its own process.” Pet. for Discr. Rev. at 8.

Specifically, they claim the trial court properly excused their failure to personally