appealable order and examined the “unintended consequences” that frequently follow.
(Russell, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 664 (conc. opn. of Rubin, J.).) Justice Rubin
observed that when a trial court grants an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, the resulting
outcome is “two separate appeals—one from the granting of the motion to strike, and a
second from the attorney’s fee order and final judgment” (ibid.), which “creates a trap
for the unwary, who may lose their right to appeal from the order granting the motion to
strike while they await the final judgment.” (Ibid., italics added.) He noted that “even
highly regarded and experienced counsel can overlook that an order granting a motion to
strike is immediately appealable.” (Ibid.) Unable to identify a public policy benefit to
“justify the cost to the parties and the courts of two separate appeals” (ibid.) and
cognizant of the “trap” for litigants, Justice Rubin proposed that the “Legislature consider
changing the statute.” (Id. at p. 665.)