6
More than 10 years ago, in his concurrence in Russell, Justice Rubin questioned
the statutory scheme making the granting of a special motion to strike an immediately
(continued)
12
within the relevant jurisdictional period—and when applicable rules of construction and
interpretation fail to require that it be deemed in law to have been so filed—the appellate
court, absent statutory authorization to extend the jurisdictional period, lacks all power to
consider the appeal on its merits and must dismiss, on its own motion if necessary,
without regard to considerations of estoppel or excuse.” (Hollister, supra, at p. 674.)
We conclude that the November 22 order granting respondents’ motions to strike
the complaint was an appealable order from which an appeal may have been taken.
(§§ 425.16, subd. (i), 904.1, subd. (a)(13).) Consequently, appellants’ challenge to the
order on the anti-SLAPP motions is not cognizable on appeal from the January 23
judgment. (Maughan, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1247 [“ ‘The taking of an appeal
is . . . jurisdictional, and where no appeal is taken from an appealable order, a reviewing
court has no discretion to review its merits.’ ”].)
B. Challenge to Order Denying Motion for New Trial Is Not Cognizable
Appellants submit that even determining the appeal to be untimely as to the ruling
on the anti-SLAPP motions does not foreclose review of the substantive issues raised in
the motion for new trial. As expressed in appellants’ supplemental briefing on the