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apparently was proposed by Kruger and signed by counsel for Rothbard. Appellants
contend that because respondents introduced the so-called “second order” and judgment,
they cannot now disclaim it as the operative order in order to claim the benefit of an
untimely appeal. (See Redevelopment Agency v. City of Berkeley (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d
158, 166 [explaining that a party who, by their conduct, induces the commission of an
error is estopped from asserting it as grounds for reversal, and similarly may waive their
right to attack error by expressly or impliedly agreeing at trial to the procedure objected
to on appeal].)
Nothing in the creation, signing, and filing of the January 23 judgment altered the
immediate appealability of the November 22 anti-SLAPP order. Jurisdictional time
limits for appealable orders may not be extended by estoppel, consent, waiver, agreement
or acquiescence. (Garibotti v. Hinkle (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 470, 480-482 (Garibotti);
see rule 8.60(d) [authorizing a reviewing court, for good cause, to “relieve a party from
default for any failure to comply with these rules except the failure to file a timely notice
of appeal”], italics added.)
The California Supreme Court has explained that such strict adherence to the
statutory time for filing a notice of appeal is not intended to “ ‘arbitrarily penaliz[e]
procedural missteps’ ” (Hollister Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. Rico (1975) 15 Cal.3d 660,
666) or to contradict sound public policy of according the right to appeal “in doubtful
cases ‘when such can be accomplished without doing violence to applicable rules’ ”
(id. at p. 674). Indeed, courts before us have cautioned that litigants in SLAPP litigation
frequently fail to recognize that the grant of a special motion to strike is an appealable
order and have even suggested that the Legislature reconsider this aspect of
section 425.16.6 But when the applicable notice of appeal “has not in fact been filed