Bevis v. Terrace View Partners, LP, 244 Cal. Rptr. 3d 797 (2019)

Citation: Bevis v. Terrace View Partners, LP, 244 Cal. Rptr. 3d 797 (2019)
Parent Document: Bevis v. Terrace View Partners, LP, 244 Cal. Rptr. 3d 797 (2019)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2019-02-28
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6240337/bevis-v-terrace-view-partners-lp/ ↗

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Plaintiffs argue that because the special verdict form did not segregate the jury's award of damages by causes of action, defendants cannot establish prejudice from Special Instruction No. 66. Plaintiffs cite several cases for the proposition that the law prohibits speculation about the jury's apportionment of damages when an unsegregated verdict form is used ( Moore v. Preventive Medicine Medical Group, Inc. (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 728, 223 Cal.Rptr. 859 ( Moore ); Heiner v. Kmart Corp. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 335, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 854 ( Heiner ); and White v. Inbound Aviation (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 910, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 71 ( White ) ), and suggest that defendants forfeited the right to assert error because they did not object to use of the verdict form, citing Greer v. Buzgheia (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1150, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 780 ( Greer ). Plaintiffs' argument raises the question whether our inability to determine the jury's allocation of damages between the various legal theories presented on the special verdict requires affirmance of the entire unsegregated verdict.

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