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truncated. In a discussion dealing with a rent ordinance claim (Wallace, supra, at pp. 1212-
1213), it string cites Action Apartment, Feldman, and Bisno v. Douglas Emmett Realty Fund
1988 (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1534—a case that does not involve the issue of statutory
conflict or section 1942.5—and then later, in a brief section dealing separately with the
retaliatory eviction claim (Wallace, at pp. 1214-1215), refers back to its prior rent ordinance
discussion, finally concluding with the categorical announcement that bringing an eviction
action and serving a notice to quit are “acts . . . subject to the absolute privilege of Civil
Code section 47, subdivision (b).” (Id. at p. 1215.) Suffice it to say we find neither of these
cases persuasive. Instead, we opt to follow the more recent and in our view better reasoned
opinion in Banuelos.
5. Agreement to Vacate
Separate and apart from his litigation privilege argument, Sagi argues that Winslett
cannot establish a claim for retaliatory eviction under section 1942.5, subdivision (d)
because she was not evicted. Drawing on Banuelos for what little assistance it might offer
him here, Sagi cites a portion of the Banuelos opinion holding that “[a plaintiff] cannot state
a common law cause of action for retaliatory eviction because that cause of action applies
only to conduct that causes the tenant to involuntarily vacate the premises.” (Banuelos,
supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 328, italics added.) In Banuelos, the court ruled that while a
common law cause of action requires actual eviction, a claim under section 1942.5 does not.
(Banuelos, at pp. 328, 336.) In this case, on the other hand, Winslett’s claim for retaliatory
eviction is based on section 1942.5, subdivision (d), not common law, so Sagi’s attempt to
apply Banuelos in his favor misses the mark.
Citing Drouet v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 583 (Drouet), Sagi adds a twist to
this line of argument, based on proviso language in section 1942.5, former subdivision (d),
stating that “ ‘[n]othing in this section shall be construed as limiting in any way the exercise
by the lessor of his [or her] rights under any lease or agreement or any law pertaining to the
hiring of property or his [or her] right to do any of the acts described in subdivision[s] (a) or
[former] (c) for any lawful cause.’ ” (Drouet, supra, at p. 592, italics added, citing