Winslett v. 1811 27th Avenue, LLC (2018)

Citation: Winslett v. 1811 27th Avenue, LLC (2018)
Parent Document: Winslett v. 1811 27th Avenue, LLC (2018)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2018-08-15
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4526968/winslett-v-1811-27th-avenue-llc/ ↗

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       Winslett’s eighth cause of action for retaliation and fifteenth cause of action for
retaliatory eviction both rest on section 1942.5, subdivision (d), as asserted in a “civil
action” under subdivision (h). Each claim incorporates by reference the same factual
background allegations, which include events encompassing the entire history of Sagi’s
alleged indifference to Winslett’s complaints about dilapidated conditions; her complaint to
Vector Control; Sagi’s irate response; and Sagi’s continued refusal to make meaningful
repairs after the visit from Vector Control, finally culminating in his serving a notice to quit
and filing an unlawful detainer action. Specifically, in paragraph 15 of the first amended
complaint, Winslett alleges that “On or about January 21, 2015, [Sagi] filed an unlawful
detainer lawsuit seeking to evict [her] from the Subject Premises.”
       The filing of an unlawful detainer complaint is anti-SLAPP protected activity, as is
service of a notice of termination preceding an unlawful detainer complaint. (Clark v.
Mazgani (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1286 (Clark); Birkner v. Lam (2007)
156 Cal.App.4th 275, 281-282.) Because Winslett concedes that the eighth and fifteenth
claims are founded on protected activity—as she must in the face of this precedent, since
“bring[ing] an action to recover possession” and “threaten[ing] to” bring such an action by
notice to quit are elements of these claims, as pleaded (see Civ. Code, § 1942.5,
subd. (d))—our examination of the trial court’s order striking them will focus on the court’s
second prong conclusion that she failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.

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