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S.F. Apartment Assn. v. City & County of S.F. (2024)

Citation
S.F. Apartment Assn. v. City & County of S.F. (2024)
Parent Document
S.F. Apartment Assn. v. City & County of S.F. (2024)
Jurisdiction
California (state)
Effective Date
2024-09-11

Other Sections in This Document (40)

Full Text

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20 Cal.App.5th at p. 518 [noting that Rental Housing “did not discuss the
impact on timing in its preemption discussion”].)
      In short, unlike the ordinance in Educators, Ordinance No. 18-22 did
not add a substantive defense to eviction for a protected group without
imposing any affirmative procedural requirement on landlords. (Educators,
supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 518.) Unlike the initiative in Rental Housing,
Ordinance No. 18-22 did not add substantive “good cause” grounds for
eviction with unspecified notice requirements contained in some of those
grounds. (Rental Housing, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 762.) Instead,
Ordinance No. 18-22 imposed a procedural notice requirement on landlords
and created a procedural barrier across all grounds for at-fault evictions. It
did so with the explicit purpose of adding more days to the three-day timeline
under section 1161. We thus conclude that Ordinance No. 18-22 is
procedural under Birkenfeld and return to plaintiffs’ arguments regarding
preemption by direct contradiction and implied field preemption.
                  IV. Ordinance No. 18-22 is Preempted
      Plaintiffs argue that Ordinance No. 18-22 directly contradicts the
three-day notice period provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 1161. We
agree. The ordinance plainly prohibits a landlord from proceeding under the
state statutory timeline by requiring the additional 10-day warning and cure
period. (Riverside, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 743.) Defendant does not appear
to dispute this difference in timing but instead repeats its argument that
there is no conflict because, under Birkenfeld, Ordinance No. 18-22 regulates
the substantive grounds for eviction. As explained above, the text and
history of Ordinance No. 18-22 do not support this argument.
      Defendant’s citations to Fisher and Foster v. Britton (2015) 242
Cal.App.4th 920 (Foster) do not alter this conclusion. In Fisher, landlords