S.F. Apartment Assn. v. City & County of S.F. (2024)

Citation: S.F. Apartment Assn. v. City & County of S.F. (2024)
Parent Document: S.F. Apartment Assn. v. City & County of S.F. (2024)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2024-09-11
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10114513/sf-apartment-assn-v-city-county-of-sf/ ↗

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      The appellate court concluded that the ordinance was not preempted
under Birkenfeld. (Educators, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 519.) It explained:
“The purpose of the Ordinance is to protect children from the disruptive
impact of moving during the school year or losing a relationship with a school
employee who moves during the school year. When tenants belong to this
protected group (or have a custodial or familial relationship with a resident
protected group member), they have a substantive defense to eviction; when
they no longer belong to the group—because the regular school year has
ended or will have ended by the effective date of the notice of termination—
they no longer have a substantive defense.” (Id. at p. 518.) The appellate
court concluded that the ordinance created a substantive defense and thus
was not preempted by the state unlawful detainer statutes. (Id. at p. 519.)
      Educators recognized that, even though the ordinance was substantive
under Birkenfeld, it had a “procedural impact” by “limiting the timing of
certain evictions.” (Educators, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 518.) But the
appellate court emphasized that the ordinance did not “impose any
procedural requirements: it does not require landlords to provide written
notice or to do any other affirmative act.” (Ibid.) Instead, the procedural
impact was “necessary to ‘regulate the substantive grounds’ of the defense it
creates.” (Ibid.) Moreover, the appellate court rejected plaintiffs’ argument
that if the ordinance were upheld as substantive, “ ‘nothing would prevent
San Francisco from mandating that all for-cause terminations occur on one
day per year.’ ” (Id. at p. 519.) The court stated: “Although the issue is not
before us, an ordinance limiting the timing of all evictions would appear to be
preempted by the unlawful detainer statutes. Such an ordinance would not
be imposed in order to regulate any substantive grounds for eviction, like the
Ordinance. The Ordinance does not impose such a blanket requirement

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