S.F. Apartment Assn. v. City & County of S.F. (2024)

Citation: S.F. Apartment Assn. v. City & County of S.F. (2024)
Parent Document: S.F. Apartment Assn. v. City & County of S.F. (2024)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2024-09-11
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10114513/sf-apartment-assn-v-city-county-of-sf/ ↗

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requirements that included “warning notices” to “ ‘be served by the landlord
prior to a notice to terminate tenancy.’ ” (Rental Housing, supra, 171
Cal.App.4th at p. 762.) These clearly substantive elements of the Oakland
initiative are not at issue in our consideration of Ordinance No. 18-22. As
explained above, the “good cause” grounds for eviction had been enumerated
in San Francisco Administrative Code section 37.9, subdivision (a) of the
Rent Ordinance for over 40 years before Ordinance No. 18-22 was enacted.
Moreover, Ordinance No. 18-22 imposed a “blanket” notice requirement
across all six grounds for eviction where the tenant is at fault. (Educators,
supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 519.) In contrast, the appellate court in Rental
Housing was tasked with deciding whether notice requirements particular to
certain grounds of eviction regulated those grounds. (Rental Housing, at
p. 763.)
      Third, unlike Ordinance No. 18-22, the notice requirements in the
Oakland initiative did not specify any particular timeline, let alone one that
intentionally extended the Code of Civil Procedure section 1161 framework.
Nor did it expressly include an extended notice requirement because it took
issue with the three-day notice standard of section 1161. Unlike Ordinance
No. 18-22, there is no indication that the Oakland initiative was proposed
because three days “really flies by” and tenants “don’t have enough time”
under the law. As a result, the only argument presented (for the first time) to
the appellate court in Rental Housing regarding the Oakland initiative’s
impact on timing challenged the vagueness of the notice provisions, which the
court reasonably rejected in view of related rent board specifications. (Rental
Housing, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at pp. 763–764.) Therefore, the appellate
court in Rental Housing had no occasion to factor timing—or explicitly
procedural motivations—into its Birkenfeld analysis. (See Educators, supra,

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