The outcome of this proceeding is dependent upon the relationship between the parties with respect to the subject apartment. While the parties agree that tenant entered into possession pursuant to the occupancy agreement, we find that tenant’s right to possession pursuant to said agreement terminated long before the instant proceeding was commenced in 2007. The contract of sale was unambiguous as to the effect of the cooperative corporation’s refusal to approve the sale: the contract would be cancelled. The stated purpose of the occupancy agreement was to accommodate the parties prior to closing. The occupancy agreement set forth specific circumstances under which tenant could maintain possession of the premises, none of which apply to the facts of this case. Accordingly, we find that tenant’s right to possession pursuant to the occupancy agreement terminated, at the latest, when the federal litigation regarding the cooperative corporation’s refusal to approve the sale had been resolved in the cooperative corporation’s favor. In addition, we find that once tenant’s right to possession under the occupancy agreement terminated and landlord continued to accept regular monthly payments in exchange for tenant’s exclusive possession of the apartment (cf. Matter of Smith v Donovan, 61 AD3d 505 [2009]), a month-to-month tenancy was created (cf. Weiden v 926 Park Ave. Corp., 154 AD2d 308 [1989]; Walker v Espinal, 4 Misc 3d 136[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 50832[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2004]). This is particularly so here, where the amounts of the monthly payments were increased from time to time pursuant to implicit or express agreements. We note that tenant does not claim that because these monthly payments were made during the purported pendency of the 1989 proceeding they must be deemed to be use and occupancy (cf. RPAPL 711 [1]), nor, under the unusual circumstances presented here, including the 14 years which elapsed following the termination of the federal litigation during which there was no activity in the 1989 proceeding, can these payments be so deemed (see McFadden v Sassower, 26 Misc 3d 141[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50316[U] [appeal No. 2008-1427 W C 2010] [decided herewith]). We further find that landlord timely served a notice to terminate the month-to-month tenancy, receipt of which notice was admitted (see Real Property Law § 232-b).