Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)

Citation: Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)
Parent Document: Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Original Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0405_0056_ZS.html ↗

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The Court has twice held that it is permissible to segregate an action for possession of property from other actions arising out of the same factual situation that may assert valid legal or equitable defenses or counterclaims. In Grant Timber & Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 236 U.S. 133 , 35 S.Ct. 279, 59 L.Ed. 501 (1915) (Holmes, J.), the Court upheld against due process attack a Louisiana procedure that provided that a defendant sued in a possessory action for real property could not bring an action to establish title or present equitable claims until after the possessory suit was brought to a conclusion. 14 In Bianchi v. Morales, 262 U.S. 170 , 43 S.Ct. 526, 67 L.Ed. 928 (1923) (Holmes, J.), the Court considered Puerto Rico's mortgage law which provided for summary foreclosure of a mortgage without allowing any defense except payment. The Court concluded that it was permissible under the Due Process Clause to 'exclude all claims of ultimate right from possessory actions,' id., at 171, 43 S.Ct., at 526, and to allow other equitable defenses to be set up in a separate action to annul the mortgage. 10

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