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DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Johnson v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development, 911 F.2d 1302 (1990)

Citation
Johnson v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development, 911 F.2d 1302 (1990)
Parent Document
Johnson v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development, 911 F.2d 1302 (1990)
Effective Date
1990-08-24

Other Sections in This Document (62)

Full Text

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Our objective in interpreting the Preservation Act is, of course, to achieve the intent of Congress. As evidence of Congressional intent we have before us such traditional sources as the language of the statute, its purposes and goals, and its legislative history. We also have the benefit of a clarifying amendment which purports to answer the very question presented by this litigation. The clarifying amendment, although enacted by a subsequent Congress, is evidence of what Congress intended when it passed the Preservation Act in 1987. Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 208-11, 105 S.Ct. 1138, 1151-53, 84 L.Ed.2d 138 (1985); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1801-02, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969); Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596, 100 S.Ct. 800, 813, 63 L.Ed.2d 36 (1980); Porter v. Commissioner, 856 F.2d 1205, 1209 (8th Cir.1988); Whalen v. United States, 826 F.2d 668, 670 (7th Cir.1987); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726, 741 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848, 108 S.Ct. 146, 98 L.Ed.2d 102 (1987); May Dept. Stores Co. v. Smith, 572 F.2d 1275, 1278 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837, 99 S.Ct. 122, 58 L.Ed.2d 134 (1978). The clarifying amendment cannot override the “unmistakable intent of the enacting [Congress],” but is particularly persuasive evidence when that *1309intent is ambiguous or obscure. Seatrain, 444 U.S. at 596, 100 S.Ct. at 813. Therefore, before deciding the issue presented on the basis of the intent expressed in the Reform Act, we must determine whether the language of the 1987 Act and its legislative history evidences an unmistakable intent on the part of Congress to exclude from the Act’s coverage voluntary mortgage insurance termination.