found that plaintiffs presented triable issues of fact on their
religious discrimination claim. Id.
But Bloch was a summary judgment case that announced
the summary judgment burden for disparate-treatment FHA
claims. Farhan’s claim is only at the pleading stage, and there-
fore subject only to the plausibility standard outlined above.
The majority acknowledges this difference in procedural pos-
ture, but nevertheless grafts the summary judgment standard
from Bloch onto the standard for a motion to dismiss. Com-
pounding its error, the majority also relies on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Inclusive Communities Project to state that
Farhan “erroneously” asserted she did not need to show in-
tent to plead an FHA claim. Ante, at 2 (citing Tex. Dep't of
Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576
U.S. 519, 524 (2015)). But that case, too, came to the Court after
summary judgment and a bench trial. See Inclusive Communi-
ties Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. 747 F.3d
275, 278–80 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 576 U.S. 519. It is the majority,
not Farhan, that “erroneously” applies Bloch and Inclusive
Communities to fashion a new pleading standard.
Case after case tells us that is wrong. In Thomas, we re-
minded litigants that “[l]ists of things that plaintiffs need to
prove concern evidence (at summary judgment and trial); they
must not be treated as demands for longer and more detailed
pleadings.” 120 F.4th at 1338. Similarly, in Carlson v. CSX
Transportation, Inc., we held that the district court erred in dis-
missing a discrimination suit when it “relied on summary
judgment decisions that address[] not the content of com-
plaints but the evidence needed to take a claim to a jury.” 758
F.3d 819, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). Thus, while I do not dispute that
courts can consult summary judgment opinions for the
22 No. 24-1532