position that defendants applied the lease policy in a discrim-
inatory or uneven fashion towards Palestinians—she frames
her claim around the “neutrality” policy alone. See Resp. to
Mot. to Dismiss [16] at 3 (main argument header) (“Requiring
Tenants to Stay Neutral In A Conflict Concerning Their Home
Countries Is National Origin Discrimination.”). While Farhan
might have pursued a straightforward claim that defendants
evicted her because she was Palestinian, she pleaded herself
out of court by affirmatively alleging the reason for her evic-
tion—“because she publicly displayed a flag of her heritage
[and] would not adhere to Defendants’ ‘neutrality’ policy”—
was based on her conduct, not identity. Tamayo v. Blagojevich,
526 F.3d 1074, 1086 (7th Cir. 2008) (“A plaintiff pleads himself
out of court when it would be necessary to contradict the com-
plaint in order to prevail on the merits.”) (internal quotation
omitted). Moreover, Farhan has consistently framed the issue
as one of viewpoint discrimination by stressing the targeting
of tenants who, regardless of national origin, chose to fly the
Palestinian flag. Farhan’s brief before the district court makes
this clear, stating that “this would not be happening if she
flew a Ukrainian flag in her window instead of a Palestinian
one.”
This highlights a central point of our disagreement with
the dissent. The dissent frames this as an issue of pleading
standards; we agree wholeheartedly that there are no height-
ened pleading standards for discrimination claims. Post at 19.
But “even a complaint that passes muster under the liberal
notice pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 8(a)(2) can be subject to dismissal if a plaintiff does not
provide argument in support of the legal adequacy of the
complaint.” Brockett, 116 F.4th at 685 (quoting Lee v. N.E. Ill.
Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 912 F.3d 1049, 1053–54 (7th Cir.
14 No. 24-1532