As we have seen, plaintiff was a tenant within the meaning of the Rent Act but was subject to being dispossessed if .he failed to pay his rent. Was he entitled to notice to quit? Plaintiff argues that because of the Rent Act he is a tenant and therefore entitled to notice. However, being a tenant for the purpose of the Rent Act does not necessarily mean that one is a tenant for all purposes. The Rent Act makes no provision for any notice to quit. *515Requirement of notice to quit is governed by our general law relating to landlord and tenant. It requires a thirty day notice to quit in order to terminate certain estates, i.e., a tenancy from month to month,7 a tenancy at will,8 and a tenancy at sufferance.9 But, within the meaning of our general law, plaintiff under the facts of this case was a roomer and not a tenant. The distinction between the two relationships was pointed out by us in Beall v. Everson, D.C.Mun.App., 34 A.2d 41, where we said: “A tenant is a purchaser of an estate, entitled to exclusive legal possession; but a roomer has merely a right to the use of the premises.” This distinction is a substantial one,10 and the Rent Act, though considering a roomer as a tenant for its purposes, did not remove the distinction and did not create the relationship of landlord and tenant in situations where it did not exist under the general law. Thus, in Beall v. Everson, supra, we held that taking roomers by a tenant did not violate a covenant against subletting. Therefore, the code sections requiring notice for termination of a tenancy have no application to a roomer.