Miller v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission, 870 A.2d 556 (2005)

Citation: Miller v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission, 870 A.2d 556 (2005) 1.
Parent Document: Miller v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission, 870 A.2d 556 (2005)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 2005-03-24
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2156421/miller-v-district-of-columbia-r... ↗

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1. In the next-to-last sentence of the opinion, the court seems to contemplate the possibility — no more than a possibility — that, on remand, the Commission’s findings “would lead to only one conclusion on the record, viz, non-willfulness,” and that in these circumstances a remand to the ALJ would,not be necessary. I suppose that this possibility theoretically exists, especially in the absence of a transcript of the evidentiary hearing. Nevertheless, absent extraordinary circumstances, a finding that Borger (the housing provider) allowed Miller to have a dog when he was not a member of a tenant organization, but told him to get rid of the dog after he joined the organization, would surely at least permit,a reasqnable inference that Borger’s retaliatory action was willful. In my view, it would, in most circumstances, be contrary to common sense to conclude that such a sequence of events must have been coincidental or otherwise not willful. If (1) Borger, a major landlord, really did not know that it was against the law to condition Mr. Miller’s right to have a dog on not joining a tenant organization, if (2) Borger adduced testimony to that effect, if (3) the trier of fact believed that testimony, and if (4) there was no contrary evidence— an extraordinarily improbable scenario — then perhaps a finding of non-willfulness would perhaps be mandated.1 Short of a situation as extreme as that, however, I am satisfied that an inference of willfulness would be at least permissible.2

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