Miller v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission, 870 A.2d 556 (2005)

Citation: Miller v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission, 870 A.2d 556 (2005)
Parent Document: Miller v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission, 870 A.2d 556 (2005)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 2005-03-24
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2156421/miller-v-district-of-columbia-r... ↗

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To eliminate any uncertainty, we now uphold as reasonable RHC’s understanding that a fíne may be imposed under § 42-3509.01(b) only where the housing provider intended to violate or was aware that it was violating a provision of the Rental Housing Act. This interpretation, as we said in Quality Mgmt., provides “independent meaning” for “willfully,” namely, the “more culpable mental state” that the term viewed in context implies. We further reject petitioner’s argument that this heightened culpability — what petitioner characterizes as “malice” — is shown any time a housing provider has been found hable for retaliation under the statute. Section 42-3505.02(b) creates a presumption of retaliation from conduct by a housing provider that takes place within six months after a tenant has done certain acts — for example, as in this case, joining a tenant organization. See § 42-3505.02(b)(4). That presumption ripens automatically into a conclusion of retaliation unless the housing provider rebuts the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. The RHC concluded that the failure alone of a housing provider to rebut the presumption of retaliation does not establish the heightened culpability necessary to support imposition of a fine. Rather, in its view, before a fine may be imposed the ALJ must make specific findings that the retaliation, like any violation, was committed with intent to violate the Act or at least with awareness that this will be the outcome. That reading of the statute is entirely reasonable. II.

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