Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109 (2005)

Citation: Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109 (2005)
Parent Document: Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109 (2005)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 2005-10-13
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1472683/douglas-v-kriegsfeld-corp/ ↗

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As to the first, the dissent premises the reasonableness of the landlord's belief that the tenant was "not suffering from a relevant `handicap'" on the trial court's finding that the tenant "had not been shown to be suffering the kind of mental impairment which would prevent her from maintaining a sanitary apartment." We have rejected that finding, however, as too narrowly premised on the absence of a "specific diagnosis" of mental illness, rather than on the more general "mental impairment" discernible even by lay persons, such as Ms. Reid, the landlord's representative who referred the tenant to St. Elizabeth's hospital.[71] The dissent's other basis for concluding as a matter of law that the tenant was not a "`qualified'" handicapped person is the Andover Housing Authority[72] case. That decision defined "qualified," however, by reference not to the nature of the illness but to whether "more than reasonable modifications," i.e., an "undue burden," would be imposed on the landlord in accommodating the tenant.[73] Plainly, no undue burden on the landlord is called for here; the only accommodation requested is a brief continuance of the eviction proceeding to test whether the tenant can follow through successfully with a government subsidized program to clean the apartment and keep it clean, failing which the tenant concededly would have to leave.

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