Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109 (2005)

Citation: Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109 (2005)
Parent Document: Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109 (2005)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 2005-10-13
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1472683/douglas-v-kriegsfeld-corp/ ↗

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Not long ago, in Giebeler v. M & B Associates,[57] the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered both the burden of proof and the merits under "reasonable accommodation" analysis applicable to the Fair Housing Act. The panel noted that courts construing that Act have drawn on case law interpreting the same requirement under the federal Rehabilitation Act (RA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).[58] The interpretive formulations under each, while conceivably *1135 differing in a way that could be outcome-determinative in some instances, are not significantly different from one another.[59] Under RA case law as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit, the party requesting accommodation "bears the initial burden of producing evidence that a reasonable accommodation was possible," whereupon "the burden shifts to the other party to produce rebuttal evidence that the requested accommodation is not reasonable."[60] The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has expressed the RA test differently, stating that the proponent "need only show he seeks a `method of accommodation that is reasonable in the run of cases' (emphasis in original)."[61] Under the ADA, the Supreme Court has adopted a formulation akin to that of the D.C. Circuit in the RA case: the requesting party "need only show that an accommodation `seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases,'"[62] after which the burden shifts to the other party "to demonstrate that the accommodation would cause undue hardship in the particular circumstances."[63] Alternatively, if the requesting party cannot show that the proposed accommodation would be reasonable in the ordinary run of cases, she "nonetheless remains free to show that special circumstances warrant a finding that ... the requested `accommodation is reasonable' on the particular facts."[64] It is important to note, therefore, that aside from the secondary, alternative formulation focused on "the particular facts" of a requested accommodation, the tenant's initial burden is to proffer a generalized, categorical accommodation (e.g., "method" of accommodation reasonable "on its face"), which the landlord has the burden of rebutting with specifics that reveal an "undue hardship" on the landlord's operation.

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