Bridges v. Clark, 59 A.3d 978 (2013)

Citation: Bridges v. Clark, 59 A.3d 978 (2013)
Parent Document: Bridges v. Clark, 59 A.3d 978 (2013)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 2013-01-24
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5146099/bridges-v-clark/ ↗

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Although Mr. Clark advances several arguments in support of the trial court’s decision to exclude the Love affidavit, we do not find those arguments persuasive. First, Mr. Clark contends that the Love affidavit was inadmissible because it was a prior inconsistent statement by Mr. Clark and thus would have been admissible only if Ms. Bridges had first confronted Mr. Clark with the affidavit. This argument is flawed for two reasons. Procedurally, Ms. Bridges actually attempted to confront Mr. Clark with the affidavit, but was prevented from doing so by the trial court’s ruling that the affidavit was inadmissible hearsay. Substantively, Ms. Bridges was not required to first confront Mr. Clark with the Love affidavit. There is a general rule that extrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement is admissible only if the witness is first given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement. See Parker v. United States, 757 A.2d 1280, 1288 (D.C.2000); see also Fed.R.Evid. 613(b). That requirement, however, does not apply to prior inconsistent statements that qualify as adoptive admissions. See Chaabi v. United States, 544 A.2d 1247, 1248 (D.C.1988) (party opponent admissions “do not require foundations, even where, as here, they are also prior inconsistent statements”); see also Fed.R.Evid. 613(b) (general requirement that witness must first be *988confronted with prior inconsistent statement “does not apply to opposing party’s statement under Rule 801(d)(2)”).

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