Bridges v. Clark, 59 A.3d 978 (2013)

Citation: Bridges v. Clark, 59 A.3d 978 (2013)
Parent Document: Bridges v. Clark, 59 A.3d 978 (2013)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 2013-01-24
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5146099/bridges-v-clark/ ↗

Full Text

1,541 chars

Second, Mr. Clark argues that instructing the jury on the retaliation defense would have resulted in unfair surprise and prejudice. Mr. Clark had ample notice, however, that Ms. Bridges intended to as*985sert a retaliation defense, because Ms. Bridges so stated in her initial answer, her amended answer, and the joint pretrial statement. For the reasons we have already explained, Mr. Clark could not reasonably have thought that the retaliation defense had been forfeited during the trial. Therefore, instructing the jury on the retaliation defense would not have unfairly surprised Mr. Clark. Cf., e.g., Han v. Southeast Acad of Scholastic Excellence Pub. Charter Sch., 32 A.3d 413, 417 (D.C. 2011) (concluding that trial court was correct to consider defense that was raised in motion for summary judgment but not pleaded as affirmative defense in initial pleadings, because opposing party had opportunity to respond, did respond, and “cannot now claim unfair surprise”); Word v. Ham, 495 A.2d 748, 751 (D.C.1985) (holding that appellants’ failure to plead waiver defense in their answer or counterclaim did not prohibit appellants from raising that defense, because “[ajppellees were put on notice of the defense by appellants’ opposition to their motion for summary judgment and had the opportunity to respond, and thus cannot claim to have been prejudiced”). Moreover, Mr. Clark has at no point identified any specific respect in which his case would have been unfairly prejudiced by submission of the retaliation defense to the jury.

Other Sections in This Document (47)

Full Text