Bernstein v. Fernandez, 649 A.2d 1064 (1991)

Citation: Bernstein v. Fernandez, 649 A.2d 1064 (1991)
Parent Document: Bernstein v. Fernandez, 649 A.2d 1064 (1991)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 1991-03-28
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2103411/bernstein-v-fernandez/ ↗

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The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress has three elements. A defendant will not be liable unless he or she engages in (1) "extreme and outrageous conduct" which (2) "intentionally or recklessly" causes (3) "severe emotional distress to another." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965), cited with approval in Sere v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., supra, 443 A.2d at 37, and Waldon v. Covington, 415 A.2d 1070, 1076 (D.C.1980). The requisite intent or recklessness "can be inferred from the outrageousness of the acts." Howard University v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 985 (D.C.1984) (citations omitted). However, a defendant will be liable "only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." RESTATEMENT, supra, § 46 comment d. Viewed in the light most favorable to Mrs. Fernandez, the evidence here simply does not meet this standard; the trial court ruled correctly in setting aside the award of compensatory damages.[17] It follows that we must also reject Fernandez's contention that the punitive damage award on this claim should be reinstated, because an award of punitive damages is permissible only when it is accompanied by an award of compensatory damages. Zanville v. Garza, supra, 561 A.2d at 1001-1002. IV. CONCLUSION

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